Toward a Taxonomy and Costing Method for Security Services by Irvine, Cynthia E. & Levin. Timothy E.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Center for Information Systems Security Studies and Research (CISR)Faculty and Researcher Publications
1999-12-00
Toward a Taxonomy and Costing
Method for Security Services
Irvine, Cynthia E.
Proceedings of the 15th Computer Security Application Conference
Proceedings of the 15th Computer Security Application Conference, Phoenix, AZ, December 1999
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/7199
Abstract
A wide range of security services may be available to
applications in a heterogeneous computer network envi-
ronment. Resource Management Systems (RMSs) responsi-
ble for assigning computing and network resources to tasks
need to know the resource-utilization costs associated with
the various network security services. In order to under-
stand the range of security services an RMS needs to man-
age, a preliminary security service taxonomy is defined.
The taxonomy is used as a framework for defining the costs
associated with network security services.
1  Introduction
Several efforts are underway to develop middleware
resource management systems (RMSs) that will logically
combine a wide range of network resources to construct a
“virtual” computational system [2] [5] [10].   Geographi-
cally distributed, heterogeneous resources are expected to
be used to support applications with a wide range of com-
putation needs. Large parallelized computations found in
fields such as astrophysics [11], aerodynamics, meteorol-
ogy, etc. will require allocation of perhaps hundreds of
individual processes. Multimedia applications, such as
voice and video will impose requirements for low jitter,
minimal packet losses, and isochronal data rates. Adaptive
applications will need to adjust to changing conditions.
The RMS in such an environment is responsible for: effi-
ciently scheduling multiple simultaneous tasks onto spe-
cific network resources; supporting user requirements for
performance and security (viz, QoS); and providing sup-
port for tasks to adapt to changing resource availability.
Users or applications submit tasks to the RMS, which
schedules the tasks for execution.   As part of the process
of estimating efficient task schedules, the RMS must bal-
ance resource-usage costs against user benefits. Specifi-
cally, there might not exist sufficient resources to
maximize the benefits to all users. Thus the RMS must
quantify the costs associated with the entire range of net-
work services. These costs include bandwidth, task execu-
tion speed, latency, storage, etc. Costing of security
services in this context has received little attention. The
challenge is to associate costs with the entire range of net-
work security services.
The purpose of this paper is to present a preliminary
taxonomy of security services, and to show how this taxon-
omy can be used as the foundation of a system for supply-
ing security-costing information to an RMS. Section 2
presents our preliminary taxonomy. Section 3 is a sketch
for how the structure of the taxonomy might be used to
define quality of security service requests to an RMS. Sec-
tion 4 examines how the cost of using various elements of
the taxonomy might be presented to an RMS; and Section
5 is a discussion and conclusion.
2  Taxonomy of security services
Users and applications on the network are presented
with various security services (e.g., authenticity, confiden-
tiality, integrity, non-repudiation, etc.). A security service
may be used to implement one or more security policies
(organizational and automated [16]), and is, in turn, imple-
mented by one or more security mechanisms (and of
course, a given security mechanism may be used to imple-
ment different security services, e.g., “OS access controls,”
in Table 1). Some mechanisms provide fixed services, and
some are variant.1 Additionally, the RMS may make
choices for the user regarding variant security mechanisms,
as part of its schedule formulation or adaptive re-schedul-
ing (see Section 4 ).
Each security mechanism is associated with a service
area, which indicates the general topographical component
of the network in which the security or protection is effec-
tive. The taxonomy identifies three service areas: end sys-
tem (e.g., a client or server system), intermediate node
(e.g., routers, switches), and network connection (i.e., the
“wire” connecting various systems and nodes). Security
1. Variant mechanisms offer the user various “degrees,” or strengths, of
security (viz., over and above some minimum requirement). See  [9]
for details.
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mechanisms associated with end systems and intermediate
nodes protect resources (e.g., data and programs) that are
associated with a node or system; for network connections,
we are concerned with mechanisms for protecting informa-
tion that is physically in transit.
Table 1 provides our preliminary taxonomy. It lists
security services, example mechanisms and associated ser-
vice areas. The service areas are designated: “IN” for Inter-
mediate Node, “NC” for network connection, and “ES” for
End System. The Total Subnet (TS) service area identifies
mechanisms that cannot be assigned exclusively to either
of IN, W, or ES.
2.1  Rationale for the taxonomy
In constructing a taxonomy one wishes it to be both use-
ful and complete.   Since a taxonomy is simply an organi-
zational artifice, it must have reason to exist, which is its
usefulness. Additionally, the taxonomy fails if it does not
account for all of the elements of the classes that it
attempts to organize.
We have found this taxonomy to be a useful tool for
characterizing the security services and requirements that a
RMS might encounter in the network context. As such, it is
useful for organizing a quality of security service request
(see Section 3 ) and for presenting costs to a Resource
Management System (See Section 4 ).
As for completeness, we assert preliminarily that the top
level is complete. Our taxonomy includes the traditional
security categories found in the literature, e.g., Pfleeger
[12] (confidentiality, integrity, availability), Ford [4]
(authentication, access control, confidentiality, integrity,
non-repudiation), and Stallings [15](confidentiality, integ-
rity, availability, authentication, nonrepudiation, access
control). (Note that in the latter two examples we find
“access control” to be redundant with availability, confi-
dentiality and integrity). Empirically, all of the example
mechanisms that we have examined so far have been
accounted for in our top level list of security services.
The second level (viz., end system, intermediate node,
and network connection) is a simple enough partitioning of
the generic network topology that we claim it to be com-
plete through inspection.   The list of mechanisms in
Table 1 is not intended to be exhaustive, but provides a
framework for illustrating the taxonomy.
3  Quality of security service requests
The security service taxonomy can be useful in under-
standing how security is involved in a Quality of Service
request. Security in the Quality of Service context has tra-
ditionally implied the general notions of one or more of the
following: confidentiality, authenticity, access control, and
integrity [3] [13]. However, there is no reason why a Qual-
ity of Security Service request could not include all of the
elements from “Security Service” and “Service Area” in
Table 1. In other words, we envision a security vector in a
fully-functional Quality of Service request to include levels
of service for the range of security services and mecha-
nisms that we have identified, where “level of service” can
indicate degrees of security with respect to assurance,
mechanistic strength, administrative diligence, etc. Thus, a
generic QoS request would look something like the follow-
ing in a BNF-style notation:
QoS Request ::=    task_specifier, security_vector,
performance_vector, other_factors
And a security vector would appear as follows:
security_vector ::= security_component [,
security_component]*
security_component ::= security_service, service_area,
level
security_service ::= <services from Table 1>
service_area ::= [ES | IN | NC]
level ::=  <mechanism-dependent security-level indica-
tor>
A component may be included in the security vector for
each variant security mechanism, i.e., for each mechanism
in the network environment that provides to the user a
choice of security “level.” For example, a partial security
vector might look like this:
data confidentiality, NC, crypto-high (e.g., 128-bit
keys),
authenticity, NC, medium (e.g., public-key signature),
nonrepudiation, ES, high-assurance (e.g., Common Cri-
teria rating EAL7 [1])
Here, for the sake of exposition, the “level” of each
security component is somewhat arbitrarily assigned.
Establishment of nomenclature and metrics for these levels
is the subject of ongoing investigations  [7]  [18]. Transla-
tion mechanisms  [6] may be utilized in presenting a high-
level Quality of Security Service interface to the user,
while managing parameters (such as a suitable translation
of “level”) to the underlying detailed security mechanisms.
4  Costing of security services
To motivate the need for security costing information, a
specific RMS scheduling mechanism is described. We  will
show how this work requires detailed security costing
information.
Resource management systems are responsible for effi-
ciently scheduling multiple tasks onto computing and net-
work resources in a distributed, heterogeneous computing
environment. RMSs support Quality of Service by schedul-
ing to meet user requirements for performance and secu-
rity, and by providing support for tasks to adapt to
changing network resource availability.
An RMS schedules tasks for execution in the network in
response to requests from users or applications. The task
may be submitted with a QoS “specification,” which articu-
lates the user’s desired quality of service, including secu-
rity services.   An RMS currently under investigation, the
Management System for Heterogeneous Networks [5], has
as its primary goal determination of the best scheduling




Data Confidentiality IN OS access controls, Cryptographic credentials
NC 40-bit DES, 128-bit Blowfish
ES OS access controls, Cryptographic credentials
Traffic Flow Confidentiality IN Active network nodes monitor traffic and inject dummy packets in response
to certain triggering conditions.
NC Communications use a Virtual Private Network with encapsulated packets
ES Traffic padding up to a defined maximum is provided. Beyond that maxi-
mum, traffic flow confidentiality cannot be guaranteed.
Data Integrity IN OS access controls, Cryptographic credentials
NC Cryptographic chaining, integrity sequence numbers, and digital signatures
ES OS access controls, Cryptographic credentials
Authenticity IN Active network supports internode authentication based on digital signa-
tures
NC Data origin authentication, i.e., IP address, digital signatures
ES OS identification and authentication mechanism; use of Digital Signature
Standard; use of trusted certificate authority
Non-Repudiation IN Active network nodes report transactions to secure logging facility
ES Digital notary and non-repudiation services
Guarantee of Service,
Availability
IN Active network nodes reserve bandwidth for network administrative traffic.
Priority-based scheduling for application traffic
NC Bandwidth reservation protocol
ES Time-slicing scheduler, FIFO scheduler with preemptive interrupts
Audit
and Intrusion Detection
IN Auditing of network control functions
TS Rule-based and profile-based network intrusion detection, intrusion corre-
lation engine to identify intrusions across a group of subnets
Boundary Control TS  firewall, proxy server, guard
support for many diverse applications, each with its own
quality of service requirements, in a distributed, heteroge-
neous environment. MSHN preserves compatibility with
existing security policies, applications and operating sys-
tems through its middle-ware role. This is in contrast to
network operating systems, which strictly control the
access to and utilization of resources, and usually require
modifications to the OS, application, or security policy.
The MSHN RMS constructs task schedules based on a
network infrastructure model. This model includes the
resource and security requirements of current and waiting
tasks, and the security and availability of network, comput-
ing and storage resources. The resulting schedules are pro-
vided to task handlers that run the tasks and provide
feedback to the scheduler. If the model is inaccurate (e.g.,
security or resource availability changes), the RMS adjusts
its model and potentially reschedules the tasks (see Figure
1).
RMS schedule construction consists of several logical
phases, or steps:
1. In the reduction phase, the scheduler finds the realiz-
able resource assignments for the task by discarding the
possible assignments that will not work according to
the model. In addition to resource availability matching
(e.g., required service type vs. resource type), security
plays a key role. Both the task and the resources are
characterized by security requirements: those of the
task must be met by a subset of the resources; those of
the resources constrain the task. The task’s security
characteristics are compared to the minimum security
requirements of the various resources and infrastructure
components to determine where the task can run. Addi-
tionally, the task’s minimum and maximum security
requirements (e.g., reflecting the user’s QoS security
specification) are compared to the services available
from the resources and infrastructure. The result is a set
of resource-assignment “solutions,” where each solu-
tion identifies various resources sufficient to run the
task.
2. The resource usage costs, including costs for accessing
security services, are derived for the various solutions.
3. In the optimization phase, an “optimum” solution is
heuristically selected. The criteria for selection is to
(attempt to) minimize costs and to maximize the QoS
benefit to the users ( [8] [9] [17]). More specifically,
using realizable resources from the reduction phase, the
scheduler attempts to create a schedule to meet QoS
requirements for all of its tasks. In order to support as
many tasks as possible, the scheduler must meet the
typical task scheduling constraints while minimizing
resource usage costs.
After step 3, some RMSs may make various network
resource reservations. Finally, the task is submitted for exe-
cution.








FIGURE 1. Resource Scheduler. The task handler is responsible for realizing the scheduler’s
execution plan and provides feedback to the scheduler so that it can dynamically adapt the
schedule to evolving resource conditions.
always applied) then the overhead for the mechanism is
part of the normal cost of running the task and the normal
costing mechanism used by the RMS will suffice. For vari-
ant security mechanisms, however, the security overhead
will vary, depending on the user's QoS request. For exam-
ple, some task invocations will utilize little, if any, of the
variant mechanism; other invocations may utilize the
mechanism at an increased level; and, the scheduler may
adapt security support (while maintaining any minimum
system security policy requirements) in order to schedule
the tasks most efficiently. The RMS must calculate how
much the use of the security mechanism will increase the
cost of the task, according to the specific security “level”
requested. For this reason, the RMS must have access to
detailed information about the resource cost (as well as the
task’s requested QoS) for each variant security mechanism.
Near-optimal solution selection depends on the accurate
estimation of per-task, per-resource, cost of security.
With respect to implementation, the RMS’s costing
information may be table-driven or algorithm-based, and
the cost measurement scale may vary for each mechanism
and resource (see Section 4.1 , below).
4.1  Costing example
The security overhead for several security mechanisms
is shown in Table 2.
The data confidentiality mechanism is a 40-bit DES
encryption mechanism implemented in the link layer. For
message non-repudiation, a commercial non-repudiation
service mechanism is used. The cost of using this mecha-
nism is a per-message exchange of n bytes with the remote
non-repudiation server, and c clocks per message-byte to
create the crypto-checksum for the message. The intrusion
detection mechanism is shown to use a fixed overhead of
the network bandwidth (e.g., for sampling and probing)
along with constant processor and storage overhead
Costing information is provided to the scheduler, which
will use these data and its current system model to select
services, including those for security, that maximize the
benefit for the collection of tasks it is serving  [8].
5  Discussion and conclusion
A taxonomic framework has been presented for describ-
ing security services in terms of broad service categories,
network “service areas,” and security mechanisms. It has
been shown that this taxonomy can be used for different
purposes, including the specification of user Quality of
Service requests, and the specification of security costs
related to network tasks.With respect to Quality of Security
Service, we have envisioned that users would be able to
specify levels or ranges of desired security service, and as
with other QoS parameters, could use these specifications
to be able to trade off levels of task performance against
requested levels of security.
Continued effort is required to determine the best units
for the cost measures. For example, all measures could be
unitless and normalized within a common framework. This
approach would require a careful description of the seman-
tics of the units with respect to each security service. Alter-
natively, units can be retained and the components
combined into a “vector” to be used by the RMS scheduler.
Additionally, further work is required to expand the
enumeration of specific security mechanisms with respect
to the described taxonomy.
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